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Abstract
We consider the problem of trade between a price setting party who has
private information about the quality of a good and a price taker who may also
have private information. We restrict attention to the case in which, under full
information, it is efficient to trade only a subset of all qualities. In particular,
we assume that trading a low (high) quality is inefficient when the seller (buyer)
sets the price. We show that there is a unique equilibrium outcome passing
Cho and Kreps (1987) “Never a Weak Best Response”. The refined outcome is
always characterized by no trade, although trade would be mutually beneficial
in some state of nature. This occurs: 1. Even if the price taker has more precise
information than the price setting party, and 2. Even when the information
received by both parties is almost perfect. Both results imply that there are
inefficiencies due to price setting that are not present in standard markets with
adverse selection. We find that the price setting party can always increase her
profits through ex-ante delegation of the price choice to an uninformed third
party. We discuss applications to professional bodies and the market for un-
skilled labor.
Jel Codes: D4, D8, L15
Keywords: Market for Lemons, Signaling, Two-Sided Asymmetric Informa-
tion, Professional Bodies, Trade Unions, Market Breakdown.
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Since Akerlof’s seminal work, a number of studies have pointed out that posted prices
may be used to separate high quality goods from lemons. The adverse selection prob-
lem would be thus mitigated by the use of prices as a signaling device. A standard
assumption in this literature is that, under full information, there are gains from
trading each of the qualities of the good potentially offered by the sellers. This as-
sumption is certainly valid in many applications. It is also motivated by the need for
a clear benchmark when assessing the inefficiencies produced by asymmetric informa-
tion. However, for certain goods and services, the idea that there are positive gains
from trade irrespectively of quality sounds far less appealing. It is conceivable that the
value to a patient of a diagnosis made by a skilled doctor greatly exceed the doctor’s
cost of making the diagnosis. However, the value to the same patient of a diagnosis
made by a quack might be zero or even negative, while the quack still incurs a cost
when making the diagnosis. Similarly, the value to a client of the assistance of an
incompetent lawyer is much lower than the cost that the lawyer incurs to study the
court case, while the opposite is probably true in the case of a talented lawyer. As
these examples show, gains from trade might be negative for a good or service of very
poor quality. Gains from trade might also be negative when the quality of the good or
service to be traded is very high. For example, consider an employer who wants to hire
a worker for a job that does not require any particular skill. It is reasonable to assume
that for unskilled workers the (opportunity) cost of supplying labor is exceeded by
the benefits that firms derive from hiring them. The same might not be true for high
ability workers.
This paper shows that allowing for negative gains from trade in particular states of
nature results in an extreme equilibrium outcome. We consider the problem of trade
between a price setting party who has private information about the good and a price
taker who is imperfectly informed but may have access to some private information as
well. Precisely, both the price setting party and the price taker observe a private signal
about the quality of the good. We focus on the case in which it is efficient to trade
only goods of certain qualities among all possible qualities. In particular, we assume
that it is inefficient to trade the quality that yields the lowest (opportunity) cost or
the highest benefit from trade to the price setting party. In the case of a price setting
seller, this happens when the seller’s evaluation for the lowest quality is higher than
the buyer’s evaluation. Symmetrically, when the buyer sets the price, this happens
when the buyer’s evaluation for the highest quality is below the seller’s evaluation.
We show that whenever the price setting party has private information and the
price taker’s information is not perfect there is a unique equilibrium outcome which
survives Cho and Kreps (1987) “Never a Weak Best Response” (NWBR). Remarkably,
in the refined outcome, trade always collapses.
The result is general to the extent that it holds independently of: a. The precision
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of the information available to the parties, b. The relative precision of the information
of one party vis-a´-vis the other. For instance, when the seller sets the price, trade
collapses even if the buyer’s information is extremely precise or if it is extremely
precise relative to the seller’s information. It is sufficient that the buyer is imperfectly
informed and that the seller has some information not directly available to the buyer
but potentially revealable through the price choice.1
In order to understand the role of price setting, a comparison with a framework in
which agents take the price as given may be useful. Consider a standard lemon market
populated by a seller and a buyer. Assume that both are price takers but everything
else is as in our setting: the seller’s (opportunity) cost of selling a low quality good
exceeds buyer’s evaluation. The opposite is true for a good of high quality. When the
probability that the good is of high quality is positive, market breakdown may only
occur if information is sufficiently imprecise. As agents’ information improves, one can
always find prices at which the probability of trade is positive. By contrast, when the
seller is price setting, the amount of trade in the refined equilibrium is always zero
independently of the quality of information (provided that information is not perfect).
The use of prices as signals, far from alleviating the adverse selection problem, might
exacerbate it.
The intuition behind the result stems from two observations. The first is that full
separation through prices is never incentive compatible. Consider the case of a price-
setting seller and a price-taking buyer and assume that gains from trading are negative
for sufficiently low qualities. The only way in which the buyer could give the seller
incentives to fully reveal her information through prices is by buying at low prices with
a higher probability than at high prices. However, this relationship between price and
probability to trade cannot hold when the seller observes a sufficiently bad realization
of her private signal. Prices which reveal the bad realization and induce the buyer to
buy are always below the minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell.
The second observation relates to the signaling role of prices out of the equilibrium
path. It is well known that beliefs satisfying NWBR allow for this type of signaling.
The effect of these “out of equilibrium” signals is to destroy any type of pooling that
may sustain trade in equilibrium. To gather intuition, consider the previous example
and suppose that the seller announces the same equilibrium price for two different
realizations of her signal, say good and bad. In the candidate equilibrium, the seller
profits less from trading when her signal is good than when is bad. The incentive to
deviate from the equilibrium price and announce a higher price is thus affected by the
signal realization. According to NWBR, buyer’s beliefs should take this difference in
incentives into account when observing a deviation. This in turn ensures that, upon
receiving a good signal, the seller wants to deviate to a higher price. Any equilibrium
1The market breakdown outcome is also quite robust. For instance, it is not affected by pertur-
bations of the the payoffs as those used by Ellingsen (1997).
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in which trade is sustained by pooling is accordingly destroyed.
The signaling role of prices might thus destroy trade, even though trade would be
the efficient outcome in some state of nature. An important implication is that the
price setting party would be always better off by committing ex-ante to strategies that
are not contingent on her private information. This suggests a possible mechanism to
restore trade. Assume that the price setting party is able to fully delegate the choice
of the price to an uninformed third party, an intermediary, acting at his behest. This
delegation provides a commitment device to trade at prices that do not depend on
the private information of the price setting party. For example, a doctor could benefit
from his professional association setting fees for him. Since the professional association
sets fees for a large number of doctors, the fees do not reveal any information about
the ability of a specific doctor.2
As observed by Matthews (1991), economists have traditionally viewed profes-
sional bodies as associations enforcing cartel prices in order to prevent competition
among members. While restricting competition is something that these bodies prob-
ably do, there could be other equally important reasons for their existence. Indeed,
while producers benefit from the formation of cartels in virtually every market, price-
setting associations of producers are not present in every market. Our analysis offers
a complementary explanation that may shed light on why this price setting role of
professional bodies is more valuable in some markets than in others. According to our
model, delegation of the price setting task to an intermediary, such as an association
of producers, is more valuable when the buyer is not perfectly informed and evaluates
a low quality good or service less than the seller. This may explain why deregulation
attempts usually encounter stiffer resistance in particular services such as health care,
for instance, than in others. Examples and applications are discussed in section 5.
There, we also discuss how the model provides a possible rationale for firms to commit
to a uniform wage policy in markets for unskilled labor.
This paper contributes to two different but related strands of the literature. The
first is the literature on the signaling role of prices in markets with imperfect informa-
tion. The second is the literature on the effect of information on trade.
Within the first strand, important contributions including Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), Laffont and Maskin (1987), Bagwell and Riordan (1991) Bagwell (1991), Over-
gard (1987) and Ellingsen (1997) have focused on the case of monopoly. In particular,
Bagwell (1991) finds that, with a downward sloping demand, the only equilibrium
which satisfies the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) is a separating equilib-
2The rationale for delegation here is different from the standard case in which the principal commits
by giving incentives different from his own to a delegate decision maker, as for instance in Fershtman
and Judd (1987) and in Persson and Tabellini (1993), or by hiring a delegate decision maker with
particular preferences, as in Schelling (1960). Here, the price setting party commits not to reveal
information by hiring a delegate decision maker who has no private information or whose action
cannot reflect the information of the price setting party.
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rium in which the high quality is traded at a higher price but the amount sold is lower
than the amount sold when the quality is low. Ellingsen (1997), who uses a setup more
directly comparable with the one developed here, considers a model with one seller and
one buyer with inelastic demand. He finds that there is a unique equilibrium which
survives D1 (Cho and Kreps 1987) and is fully separating. Finally, Voorneveld and
Weibull (2005) characterize all equilibria in a model with a perfectly informed seller
and a buyer who observes a private signal. All these models assume that a positive
amount of trade is efficient independently of the monopolist’s quality. In other words,
under full information, there are positive gains from trading each of the qualities of
the good. Moreover, none of the mentioned papers considers the case of a seller with
imperfect information or the case of a price setting buyer.3
Within the second strand of literature, Levin (2001) considers a model in which
both buyer and seller are price taker. He finds that the relationship between infor-
mation asymmetries and trade is not monotonic. Kessler (2001), in a competitive
market, finds similar results by varying the fraction of informed sellers. We show, in
a price setting contest, that there is a discontinuity of the refined equilibrium in the
precision of information available. When the price setting party has perfect informa-
tion, the amount of trade drops from the full information level to zero as soon as the
price taker’s information becomes noisy.4 Finally, in an informed-principal framework,
Ottaviani and Prat (2001) show that the principal always benefits from committing
to directly reveal the information that can be guessed through the contract he offers
and destroying the rest. In our setup, in which direct revelation is not possible, the
monopolist is always better off by committing to a “contract” that does not reveal any
information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two considers the case of a price-setting
seller. Section three extends the results to the case of a price-setting buyer. Sec-
tion four illustrates the benefits of delegation. Section five discusses examples and
applications. Section six concludes.
2 The Price-Setting Seller Model
A seller (S) is endowed with one unit of a good. The quality q of the good can be
either high (H) or low (L). A buyer (B) has inelastic demand and consumes either
one unit or nothing. The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 0 Nature draws
3Wilson (1980) considers the case of price setting buyers in a market populated by many agents.
However, differently from our setup, the price taking sellers are perfectly informed.
4Mailath et al (1993) use a similar discontinuity argument to criticize the use of refinements based
on forward induction. While we do not have strong views on the issue, we believe that the use of a
forward induction refinement makes our results more directly comparable with the existing literature
on the signaling role of prices (see for example Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bagwell and Riordan
(1991) Bagwell (1991), and Ellingsen (1997)).
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q ∈ {H,L} from a Bernoulli distribution with Pr(q = H) = λ and Pr(q = L) = 1− λ.
At stage 1, either S or both S and B exogenously receive some private information
about the quality of the good (see below). At stage 2, S announces a price p at which
he is willing to trade. The price announced by S is assumed to be a take-it-or-leave-it
offer. At stage 3, B observes p and chooses whether to buy or not. Finally, at stage
4, payoffs are realized.
As for the information available to S and B, we first consider the extreme case
in which S is perfectly informed while B only relies on prior information and on the
information conveyed by the price. We then turn attention to the general case in
which both S and B receive a private signal, sS and sB respectively.
Seller S values a high quality good vH and a low quality good vL < vH . Alter-
natively, vq, q = L,H, can be viewed as the cost of producing a good of quality q
(provided that production occurs conditional on trade). B values a high quality good
uH and a low quality good uL < uH . We assume uH > vH and uL < vL such that there
is a potential gain from trading the high quality and a potential loss from trading the
low quality. The last assumption is an aspect in which this model departs from the
existing literature. As discussed in the introduction, one can think of several examples
in which this assumption is appropriate, including professional advise by physicians,
engineers, psychologists, etc.
The equilibrium concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). We give
the definition for the general case. Denote with µ(sS|p, sB) the belief function giving
B’s probability assessment that S has observed a signal realization sS given p and sB.
A PBE for the general case is a strategy profile for S and B and a belief function
µ∗(sS|p, sB) which satisfy the usual conditions: 1) S’s best reply, 2) B’s best reply,
3) consistency of µ∗(sS|p, sB) for all p that are announced with positive probability in
equilibrium. In order to avoid the common “unsent message” problem, we refine the
PBE concept with Cho and Kreps (1987) version of “Never a Weak Best Response”
(NWBR). Intuitively, for any p that is announced with probability zero in equilibrium,
if the set of B’s best responses for which a seller observing sS weakly benefits from
announcing p (relative to his equilibrium payoff) is contained in the set for which a
seller observing s′S > sS strictly benefits, then B, upon observing p, assigns probability
zero to sS.
Before characterizing the equilibrium, it is worth considering the first best bench-
mark. With full information trade only occurs if the seller is of type H. Thus, total
expected surplus is W FI = λ[uH − vH ]. Since S is able to extract all the surplus from
B under full information, S’s profits are equal to W FI .
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2.1 The extreme case: S is perfectly informed and B has no
private information
This section illustrates how the market breaks down in the extreme case in which the
seller has perfect information and the buyer combines prior information with informa-
tion conveyed by the price. In the next section we consider the general case in which
both B and S receive a private signal.
Let µ(q|p) denote B’s beliefs on the quality of the good upon observing p. The
application of NWBR is straightforward in this case. Consider a deviation p. If
the set of B’s mixed best responses for which type H strictly benefits (relative to his
equilibrium payoff) contains the set for which type L weakly benefits, then µ∗(L|p) = 0.
Proposition 1. There is a unique NWBR-refined equilibrium outcome, and this is
such that no trade occurs.
The proof uses two arguments. First, there is no separating equilibrium in which
trade occurs. Intuitively, type L can only trade by mimicking type H so that separa-
tion is never incentive compatible. Second, no pooling or hybrid equilibrium survives
NWBR. If a price p is announced by both types, a type H seller always prefers to
deviate to a price higher than p in order to signal his type. The intuition here is that
trading at p is relatively more costly for type H since vH > vL. The potential gain
from a deviation p′ > p, relative to the equilibrium payoff, is higher for type H than
for type L. It follows that type H is “more seemly” to benefit from the deviation.
Hence, B should believe that the deviation comes from type H. This in turn implies
that it is always profitable to deviate to some p′, thus destroying any pooling or hybrid
equilibria.
Differently from Akerlof (1970), the market breakdown is not induced by a down-
ward pressure on the price due to adverse selection. Here, the market breakdown is
caused by an upward pressure on the price driven by signaling concerns. The main
effects at work can be metaphorically described as an “upward race”. Given pooling,
type H increases his price to differentiate himself from type L. Given separation, type
L increases his price to mimic type H. When the price reaches uH , no further up-
ward deviation is possible, since B would never buy at higher prices. However, if both
types announce p = uH , B replies by not buying. Hence, the only refined equilibrium
is one in which the market breaks down. Clearly, this equilibrium is sustained by
off-equilibrium beliefs which give a weight large enough to type L. This is robust to
NWBR since both types make zero surplus. It follows that both types have the same
incentive to deviate to any p > vH .
It is immediate to show that NWBR-refined outcome survives (unobserved) small
perturbations of the buyer’s evaluation, as in Ellingsen (1997). This suggests that the
market breakdown result is not a consequence of the inelasticity of demand.
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2.2 The general case: both S and B observe a private signal
In this section we consider the general case in which both S and B observe a private
signal about the quality of the good. The timing of the game is as follows. At stage
0, Nature draws q ∈ {H,L}. At stage 1, both S and B observe a private signal (sS
and sB respectively). At stage 2, S announces a price p. At stage 3, B observes p and
decides whether to buy or not. Finally, at stage 4, payoffs are realized.
The signals sB ∈ [sB, sB] and sS ∈ [sS, sS] received by B and S are assumed to be
independently drawn conditional on quality q. The density function for sB is denoted
with f(sB|q) and the cumulative with F (sB|q). The density function for sS is denoted
with g(sS|q) and the cumulative with G(sS|q). We impose standard restrictions on
f(.|q) and g(.|q):
Assumption 1. f(.|q) and g(.|q):
1. are continuous with full support;
2. satisfy the Monotonic Likelihood Ratio Property, i.e.
f(sB|H)
f(sB|L) is increasing in sB (1)
g(sS|H)
g(sS|L) is increasing in sS (2)
and the above ratios have full support (0,∞).
The main result of this section is the following.
Proposition 2. Assume that f(.|q) is non-degenerate and satisfies assumption 1.
Then in both of the two following cases:
1. g(.|q) is non-degenerate and satisfies assumption 1,
2. S is perfectly informed so that g(.|q) is degenerate,
there is a unique NWBR-refined equilibrium outcome, and this is such that no trade
occurs.
In order to understand the intuition, it is worth analyzing the extent of the result.
The results of proposition 1 not only apply to the case in which S receives a more
precise signal than B, but also to the case in which B observes a more precise signal
than S. Since proposition 2 holds for all non-degenerate distributions of B’s signal,
the only robust equilibrium is such that no trade ever occurs, even when B has better
information. In other words, in order to have trade collapsing, it does not matter
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whether the seller is more informed than the buyer. It is sufficient that the seller
have some private information which could be potentially disclosed through the price
choice. It follows that the impossibility of trade is more pervasive than in a standard
adverse selection model in which agents are price-takers. The ability of the seller to
convey information through prices amplifies the effect of adverse selection rather than
reducing it.
As in the previous section, the result relies on the impossibility of separating equi-
libria and on the fact that pooling and hybrid do not pass NWBR. We sketch the
argument for the case in which g(.|q) is non-degenerate. In this case, S’s evaluation
is a function of his signal sS. It can be shown that if S weakly prefers to announce
p to p′ < p when he has a low evaluation of the good, then he strictly prefers to
announce p when he has a high evaluation. Intuitively, this sorting condition ensures
that higher prices correspond to higher valuations of S. B decides to buy only if the
realization of his signal sB is above a certain threshold which depends on the price
announced by S. In a separating equilibrium, lower prices have two opposite effects on
B’s willingness to buy. They reduce B’s threshold since he has to pay less for the good
(direct effect), and increase B’s threshold since they signal that S has a low evaluation
(signaling effect). For a separating equilibrium to be viable, the direct effect should
always prevail. The probability to sell must be decreasing in the price in order to
provide incentives for S to announce low prices when his evaluation is low. However,
for low enough realizations of S’s signal, the price should drop below vL to ensure that
the probability with which B buys does not go to zero, since vL > uL. This cannot
happen since S always loses from any p < vL. Hence, the signaling effect prevails and
no separating is possible.
Let us now focus on pooling and hybrid. In these equilibria, the same price p
is announced for different evaluations of S. The sorting condition implies that, for
any B’s response, a seller with a given evaluation prefers to deviate to a higher price
whenever a seller with a lower evaluation weakly prefers to deviate. Intuitively, B,
upon observing a deviation to a higher price, infers that the deviation comes from
the type of seller who gains more from deviating, relative to his equilibrium payoff
(NWBR). This is always the type with the highest signal among the signals for which
S announces p. Clearly, these out of equilibrium beliefs provide S with a strong
incentive to raise the price.
These results point out an intrinsic instability of the equilibrium: as soon as the
information is perturbed, the equilibrium outcome radically changes. To see this,
consider the case in which the precision of the private signals is almost perfect so
that the game approximates the full information game. Since proposition 2 holds for
all non-degenerate distributions, the amount of trade is discontinuous with respect
to the precision of the signals. Whenever a negligible amount of noise is introduced,
the amount of trade drops from the full information level to zero. In particular,
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since proposition 2 holds even if S has perfect information, it is sufficient a small
perturbation of B’s information for trade to collapse entirely.
3 The Price-Setting Buyer Model
This section considers the case in which B sets the price. We maintain the assumption
that vH > vL and uH > uL, but we now assume that potential gains from trading the
low quality are positive and potential gains from trading the high quality are negative.
It is shown that this game is symmetric to the one in which the S sets the price:
whenever uL > vL and uH < vH , all results found in the previous section apply.
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 0, Nature draws q ∈ {H,L}. At
stage 1, either B or both S and B exogenously receive some private information about
the quality of the good. At stage 2, B announces a price p at which he is willing to
trade. At stage 3, S observes p and chooses whether to sell or not. Finally, at stage
4, payoffs are realized.
Proposition 3. When B sets the price the results are symmetric to those of proposi-
tions 1 and 2. In particular, if g(.|q) is non-degenerate and satisfies assumption 1, in
both of the following cases:
1. f(.|q) is non-degenerate and satisfies assumption 1,
2. B is perfectly informed so that f(.|q) is degenerate,
there is a unique NWBR-refined equilibrium outcome and is such that no trade occurs.
The proof relies on a symmetry argument. The game in which B sets the price
and uH < vH is symmetric to the game in which S sets the price and uL < vL. Hence,
the same results apply.
The intuition is again that separating equilibria are not possible. In a separating
equilibrium, B should announce a higher price whenever he has a higher evaluation. As
before, lower prices have both a negative (direct) effect and a positive (signaling) effect
on S’s willingness to trade. In order to give incentive to B to reveal his evaluation
through the price, the direct effect should always prevail. This does not happen when
B observes very high realizations of his signal and thus has a high valuation. The
price that B should announce to make S willing to sell should jump above uH which
is always dominated for B. Hence, for evaluations high enough, B would pretend that
his evaluation is low by announcing a low price.
As for pooling and hybrid equilibria, they never pass NWBR. In pooling and hybrid,
the same price is announced for different evaluations. The lower the signal received
by B, the higher is the incentive to deviate to a lower price. NWBR implies that
S’s off-equilibrium beliefs take this into account. This in turn makes the deviation
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profitable for B. Intuitively, B wants to lower the price when his evaluation is low in
order to differentiate himself. On the other hand, he wants to lower the price when
his evaluation is high to mimic a low evaluation buyer. This ensures that the price
eventually reaches vL at which no trade occurs.
In the next section we show that if the buyer committed to a price higher than vL
before observing his signal, trade would occur with probability bounded away from
zero. Section 5 uses this intuition to explain why employers in the market for unskilled
jobs could benefit from committing to an equal wage policy. In other words, the
employer can increase its profits by committing to offer the same wage to all workers
with similar duties independently of the worker-specific information received. Trade
unions may thus act as a commitment device for the employer.
4 Delegation of Price Decisions to an Uninformed
Party
The previous sections show that, when the party setting the price has private infor-
mation, market breakdown is a pervasive phenomenon. If one believes that NWBR is
a sensible refinement, then our analysis suggests that absence of trade is the most rea-
sonable outcome. Even if one considers NWBR an excessively strong refinement which
may sometimes eliminate reasonable equilibria, our results still show that the equilib-
rium with no trade cannot be dismissed as the product of peculiar off-equilibrium
beliefs.
Either way, it is interesting to ask whether mechanisms can be put into place to
prevent trade from completely collapsing. A natural mechanism is repeated interac-
tion. However, repeated interaction might not be feasible in some circumstances. A
different (partial) solution would be giving the right to set the price to the buyer when
his evaluation for the low quality is lower than the seller’s, and to the seller when
his evaluation for the high quality exceeds that of the buyer. However, this would
require parties to voluntarily renounce to their price setting power in favor of their
counterparty.
A more sensible mechanism from the price-setting party viewpoint, is to commit
ex-ante to a pricing policy that is independent of his information. In this way, the
price-setting party can avoid to reveal his information through prices and a positive
amount of trade is restored. A possible way to commit is to delegate pricing decisions
to an uninformed third party acting in the interest of the price setting party. In the
next section, we provide examples in which this type of mechanism is at work.
For simplicity, we consider the case in which S is price setting, vL > uL, and
vH < uH . The same results apply to the case in which B is price setting, vL < uL, and
vH > uH . Assume now that S is able to delegate the price choice to an uninformed
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agent D. This agent chooses pD in order to maximize S’s ex-ante expected profits.
We assume that S is bound to sell at the price announced by D. The next result
illustrates the benefits of delegation.
Proposition 4. Under delegation the expected amount of trade, S’s expected profits,
and expected total surplus are bounded away from zero.
The proof relies on the fact that D, by announcing some price pD ∈ (vH , uH) is
always able to achieve a positive probability of trade. Intuitively, S is always willing
to trade at pD. As for B, he is willing to trade at pD for high realizations of his signal.
The surplus is lower than the first best level since B can make two types of errors:
buying when q = L (type I) and not buying when q = H (type II). The reason why
total expected surplus is positive is that B chooses a threshold value on his signal to
optimally exploit the trade-off between the two types of errors. Therefore, B’s losses
never outweigh his gains in expectations.
In general, the surplus under delegation is less than the first best. However, for
the case of two qualities, the surplus under delegation converges to the first best as
the precision of B’s signal goes to infinity. Intuitively, as B’s information becomes
perfect, the probabilities to commit both type I and type II errors converge to zero.
This result however does not hold in general if we consider more than two qualities.
Consider the case of potential gains from trading more than one quality and assume
that D can announce only one price. To gather intuition, suppose there are three
qualities (L,M,H) such that vH > vM > vL and uH > uM > uL. Assume that gains
from trading quality M are positive, i.e. uM > vM . Under full information trade
would occur at two different prices in this case. If D can announce only one price, the
upper bound of the surplus generated by trade is lower than the first best.
5 Examples and Applications
In this section we discuss a possible example in which the seller delegates the choice
of the price to third parties: professional bodies. We also discuss an application of the
price setting buyer model which provides a possible rationale for trade unions in the
market for unskilled jobs.
5.1 Professional Bodies
Professional services provide a number of examples of situations in which the value of
a low quality service is higher for the seller than for the buyer. Practitioners bear a
positive cost to provide a low quality service whereas the utility for the customer may
be zero or even negative, as in the case of a physician making a wrong diagnosis or a
dentist using non-sterile instruments. In many countries, however, practitioners do not
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set fees directly. A professional association or the government often set fees in their
stead. In many cases, they are even forbidden to advertise their fees. Independently
of whether fee scales are considered as mandatory or just “recommended” by the
professional association, the members tend to consider them as binding.5 Since the
professional body typically sets the fees for a large number of members, these convey
no information about the quality of a specific practitioner.
Economists have traditionally viewed professional bodies as associations enforcing
cartel prices in order to prevent competition among members (Matthews 1991). We do
not deny that this is a sensible explanation for the existence of professional bodies. Our
results provide a complementary explanation which can shed light on some features of
professional bodies that are not fully explained by the traditional view. For instance,
our results may explain why this price setting function of professional associations has
survived in service markets such as health but not in other markets such as interior
design or decoration. Moreover, they may explain why some professional associations
set maximum fees.6 These are clearly of no help in preventing undercutting. By
contrast, in our model, a maximum price between buyer and seller evaluation for the
high quality could produce a positive amount of trade.
5.2 The Market for Unskilled Labor
Consider the problem of an employer (buyer) who wants to hire a worker (seller) for
an unskilled job. The worker’s ability can be either high or low. The worker has
private but imperfect information about his ability. The firm also obtains private
information through selection procedures, references, etc. Hence, both the worker and
the firm observe a private signal relative to the worker’s ability. Given that the job
does not require any particular training or skill, it is reasonable to assume that the
cost of taking up the job to a high ability worker (including forgone opportunities)
exceeds the benefit to the firm, while the benefit exceeds the cost if the worker is low
ability. If the employer is price setting, our results suggest that it would be mutually
beneficial if the employer committed to a wage before collecting any information about
the candidate. Committing to a wage between vL and uL always ensures a positive
probability of trade. This commitment would prevent the employer from deviating to
lower wages in order to signal that he has a low evaluation of the worker’s ability. For
most unskilled jobs, wages are negotiated by trade unions for all workers. Typically,
5Shinnick and Stephen (2000), citing the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, report “... al-
though disciplinary action could not be taken specifically for breach of a recommended scale, the fact
that the fees charged were not in accordance with the scale might in some circumstances be quoted
in support of a charge of breach of some other rule .... such that the established practitioner would
not depart more readily from a ’recommended’ scale than from a mandatory scale.”
6For instance, the Professional Board for Psychology in South Africa sets “Ethical Tariffs” that
provide a ceiling to the rates chargeable by the members.
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a stated objective of trade unions is equal treatment for all workers doing the same
type of job. Interestingly, our results suggest that also the employer could benefit from
being constrained to offering equal wage treatment to all workers.
6 Conclusions
We considered a model of monopoly/monopsony with two-sided private information.
Our results showed that, under empirically relevant assumptions, the only NWBR-
refined equilibrium outcome involves complete market breakdown. We also found that
a positive amount of trade can be restored if the price-setting party delegates the
choice of the price to an uninformed agent. The model can be extended in several
ways. First, it would be interesting to investigate under what conditions trade would
occur in a model in which the action space is not restricted to the price choice. The
price setting party may have other ways to signal quality in addition to the price
(e.g. advertising). Second, the assumption that the price set by the delegated decision
maker reflect only publicly available information is reasonable in some applications,
such as professional bodies for instance, but not in others. Since in our model this
assumption is necessary to produce a positive amount of trade, it is interesting to
assess under what conditions trade is possible when the delegated decision maker
has private information. In particular, we would like to explore whether a conflict
of interests between the delegated decision maker and the price setting party may




A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proposition is proved in three steps. We first prove that there is no separating
equilibrium in which trade occurs. Then we prove that no NWBR-refined equilibrium
in which trade occurs can involve any type of pooling. Finally, we prove that outcome
involving market breakdown is a NWBR-refined equilibrium.
Lemma 1. There is no fully separating equilibrium in which trade occurs.
Let PL and PH be the set of prices announced in equilibrium by type L and H
respectively. If PL ∩ PH = , type L is never able to trade. However, type L would
benefit from trading at any p ∈ PH if p is optimal for type H. Hence, type L would
always try to mimic type H.
Lemma 2. No NWBR-refined equilibrium in which trade occurs can be a pooling or a
hybrid equilibrium.
Consider a pooling/hybrid equilibrium with trade. Let pˆ be some price at which
pooling occurs. Suppose that type H announces pˆ with probability βH (possibly 1)
and type L announces pˆ with probability βL (possibly 1). Then B’s expected utility
at pˆ is:
λβH
λβH + (1− λ)βLuH +
(1− λ)βL
λβH + (1− λ)βLuL − pˆ (A.1)
Let αˆ be the (possibly 1) probability with which B buys at pˆ. Payoff at pˆ for H is:
αˆ(pˆ− vH) (A.2)
payoff for L is:
αˆ(pˆ− vL) (A.3)
Consider a deviation p and assume that the buyer, upon observing p, buys with prob-
ability α. Then type L is eliminated according to NWBR if, for all α such that
α(p− vL) ≥ αˆ(pˆ− vL), (A.4)
the following holds:
α(p− vH) > αˆ(pˆ− vH) (A.5)
Consider an upward deviation p > pˆ and suppose that (A.4) holds. It is easy to verify








The first inequality comes from (A.4) while the second comes from p > pˆ. Note that
the above expression implies that (A.5) is satisfied. Therefore, the low quality can be
always eliminated from the deviation. But then, unless pˆ = uH , the high quality has
always incentive to deviate. On the other hand pˆ = uH cannot be an equilibrium so
long as βL > 0.
Lemma 3. There is a NWBR-refined equilibrium in which no trade occurs.
Consider a situation in which S always announces p = uH and B never buys. This
is clearly an equilibrium. It is also robust to NWBR since, for a deviation p ≥ vH , the
set of B’s best responses that make type L willing to deviate coincides with the set
of best responses that make type H willing to deviate. Therefore, type L cannot be
eliminated.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We start by giving the proof for the case in which S is perfectly informed and B
observes a private signal (case 2 in proposition 2). Then we turn to the case in which
both B and S observe private signals (case 1 in proposition 2).
A.2.1 S is perfectly informed and B observes a private signal
We start by showing that no separating equilibrium in which trade occurs exists. Then
we show that no pooling or hybrid equilibrium in which trade occurs passes NWBR.
Lemma 4. There is no separating equilibrium in which trade occurs.
Proof. The proof given for the case in which B has only prior information also applies
to this case. This follows from the fact that in a perfectly separating equilibrium,
B always discards his exogenous signal. He already obtains perfect information by
looking at the prices. But then, in a separating equilibrium, the low quality could not
be traded and a low quality seller would always try to mimic the high quality. Hence,
no separation is possible.
Lemma 5. No pooling-hybrid equilibrium in which trade occurs survives NWBR.
Proof. Suppose as before that pooling occurs at pˆ < uH . A high quality seller an-
nounces pˆ with probability βH and a low quality seller announces pˆ with probability
βL (possibly 1). B observes price pˆ and receives a signal s (we omit the B subscript
from the signal). B’s expected utility from buying at pˆ is:
λβHf(s|H)
λβHf(s|H) + (1− λ)βLf(s|L)uH +
(1− λ)βLf(s|L)
λβHf(s|H) + (1− λ)βLf(s|L)uL − pˆ (A.7)
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uH − pˆ (A.8)
Notice that the LHS is an increasing function of s and the RHS is positive. Given the
full support assumption, there always exist a threshold s∗ ∈ [s, s] such that B buys if
s > s∗ and does not buy if s < s∗. Hence, B uses a threshold strategy s∗. S’s payoff
is:
[1− F (s∗|H)](pˆ− vH) (A.9)
when he is of type H and:
[1− F (s∗|L)](pˆ− vL) (A.10)
when he is of type L. Suppose now that B observes a deviation p > pˆ. Upon observing
p, B uses a a threshold sD (see Benabou and Tirole 2003 on this way to use NWBR).
According to NWBR, type L can be eliminated from the deviation if the set of values
for sD that make him weakly benefit from the deviation is contained in the set of
values that make type H strictly benefit. Type L would (weakly) benefit whenever:
[1− F (sD|L)](p− vL) ≥ [1− F (s∗|L)](pˆ− vL) (A.11)
The low quality is eliminated if, whenever (A.11) holds, the following also holds:
[1− F (sD|H)](p− vH) > [1− F (s∗|H)](pˆ− vH) (A.12)
Note that (A.12) is always true whenever sD ≤ s∗ since type H would get a higher
price and a lower threshold (which implies a higher probability to sell). Assume then
sD > s∗. As before, the following is true for p > pˆ:
1− F (sD|L)





The first inequality comes from (A.11) and the second comes from p > pˆ. All that
remains to show to prove that (A.12) holds and type L can be eliminated is that:
1− F (sD|H)
1− F (s∗|H) ≥
1− F (sD|L)
1− F (s∗|L) (A.14)
Rewrite the above as:
(1− F (sD|H))(1− F (s∗|L))− (1− F (s∗|H))(1− F (sD|L)) ≥ 0 (A.15)
Note that the limit of the above expression for sD → s∗ is 0. The limit for sD going
to s is zero as well. Consider the derivative with respect to sD
−f(sD|H)(1− F (s∗|L)) + f(sD|L)(1− F (s∗|H)) (A.16)
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1− F (s∗|H) (A.17)
and is decreasing whenever the reverse inequality holds. Given the MLRP (which
implies that f(s
D|H)
f(sD|L) is an increasing function), the LHS of inequality (A.15) must be
an increasing-decreasing function (i.e. increasing for small values of sD and decreasing
beyond a threshold). Since the LHS of inequality (A.15) is an increasing-decreasing
function which converges to zero as sD moves toward the bounds of (s∗, s), it follows
that it cannot be negative in (s∗, s). Hence, the low type can be always eliminated.
Since type L can be eliminated, for deviations to p < uH , B would always buy with
probability one. But then, it is always optimal for S to deviate to prices p ∈ (pˆ, uH).
Lemma 6. There always exists a NWBR-refined equilibrium in which trade does not
occur.
The proof is identical to that of lemma 3. Both type H and type L announce uH
and B selects a threshold equal to s.
A.2.2 Both S and B receive a private signal
We start by proving that B follows a threshold strategy. Then we show that a sorting
condition holds. Given the sorting condition, no separation is possible. We then show
that no pooling/hybrid passes NWBR. Finally, we show that there is a NWBR-refined
equilibrium involving no trade.
Lemma 7. B′s payoff is monotonically increasing in his signal sB, i.e. B follows a
threshold strategy.
Suppose that S announces price p for some set of signal realizations Σ(p). Since
sS is, conditionally on q, independent of sB, the price p also is independent on sB
conditionally on q. Hence, it is easy to show that:
Pr(q|sB, p) = f(sB|q) Pr(p|q) Pr(q)∑
q∈{H,L} f(sB|q) Pr(p|q) Pr(q)
(A.18)
B’s expected payoff from buying at p is therefore:
λf(sB|H) Pr(p|H)
λf(sB|H) Pr(p|H) + (1− λ)f(sB|L) Pr(p|L)uH +
+
(1− λ)f(sB|L) Pr(p|L)
λf(sB|H) Pr(p|H) + (1− λ)f(sB|L) Pr(p|L)uL − p (A.19)
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From the MLRP, the LHS is an increasing function of sB. Given the full support
assumption, there always exists a threshold s∗B ∈ [sB, sB]. Hence, B follows a threshold
strategy.
Lemma 8. (Sorting) Let sS and s
′
S < sS be two realization of S’s signal. Let also p
and p′ < p be two prices. Whenever type s′S weakly prefers p to p
′, then type sS strictly
prefers p to p′.
Consider S’s payoff when S chooses to sell and has received a signal sS:
[Pr(H, sB > s
∗
B|sS) + Pr(L, sB > s∗B|sS)]p+ Pr(H, sB < s∗B|sS)vH +
+Pr(L, sB < s
∗
B|sS)vL (A.21)
The payoff when S decides not to sell is:
Pr(H|sS)vH + Pr(L|sS)vL (A.22)
It is easy to show that Pr(q, sB > s
∗
B|sS) = (1 − F (s∗B|q)) Pr(q|sS) Therefore, the
expected net payoff is:
[(1− F (s∗B|H)) Pr(H|sS) + (1− F (s∗B|L)) Pr(L|sS)]p+
+F (s∗B|H) Pr(H|sS)vH + F (s∗B|L) Pr(L|sS)vL − Pr(H|sS)vH − Pr(L|sS)vL =
= (1− F (s∗B|H)) Pr(H|sS)(p− vH) + (1− F (s∗B|L)) Pr(L|sS)(p− vL)(A.23)
Let sS and s
′
S < sS be two realizations of S’s signal. Let also p and p
′ < p be two
prices. In order to have sorting, whenever type s′S weakly prefers p to p
′, then type sS
strictly prefers p to p′. Type s′S weakly prefers p when:
(1− F (s∗B(p)|H)) Pr(H|s′S)(p− vH) + (1− F (s∗B(p)|L)) Pr(L|s′S)(p− vL) ≥
(1− F (s∗B(p′)|H)) Pr(H|s′S)(p′ − vH) + (1− F (s∗B(p′)|L)) Pr(L|s′S)(p′ − vL) (A.24)
where s∗B(p) and s
∗
B(p
′) are B’s thresholds when B observes prices p and p′ respectively.
Type sS strictly prefers p when
(1− F (s∗B(p)|H)) Pr(H|sS)(p− vH) + (1− F (s∗B(p)|L)) Pr(L|sS)(p− vL) >
(1− F (s∗B(p′)|H)) Pr(H|sS)(p′ − vH) + (1− F (s∗B(p′)|L)) Pr(L|sS)(p′ − vL) (A.25)
For s∗B(p) ≤ s∗B(p′), condition A.24 trivially holds. Suppose then that s∗B(p) >
s∗B(p
′). By using Pr(L|sS) = 1 − Pr(H|sS), conditions (A.24) and (A.25) can be
rewritten as:
A ≥ Pr(H|s′S)[A+ C] (A.26)
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A > Pr(H|sS)[A+ C] (A.27)
where:
A = [1− F (s∗B(p)|L)](p− vL)− [1− F (s∗B(p′)|L)](p′ − vL) (A.28)
C = [1− F (s∗B(p′)|H)](p′ − vH)− [1− F (s∗B(p)|H)](p− vH) (A.29)
We distinguish between two cases: A < 0 (Case 1) and A ≥ 0 (Case 2). Case 1:
A < 0. If A is negative, then, from condition (A.26), A+C is also negative. One can









Since, from the MLRP, Pr(H|s′S) > Pr(H|sS), condition (A.31) is always verified.








where the first inequality comes from A ≥ 0 and the second from p > p′. As shown in
the proof of lemma 5, the MLRP implies that the following holds:
1− F (s∗B(p)|H)
1− F (s∗B(p′)|H)


















respectively. Since the LHS of (A.35) is always positive, the above inequality always
holds.
Lemma 9. There is no separating equilibrium in which trade occurs.
A separating equilibrium is a one-to-one map p(.) from the set of realizations of
S’s signal, sS, into the set of prices. Given lemma 8, the function p(.) is monotonically
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increasing in sS. Upon observing a particular price p, B is able to retrieve sS. B’s
expected utility from buying at p is:
λf(sB|H)g(sS(p)|H)
λf(sB|H)g(sS(p)|H) + (1− λ)f(sB|L)g(sS(p)|L)uH +
+
(1− λ)f(sB|L)g(sS(p)|L)
λf(sB|H)g(sS(p)|H) + (1− λ)f(sB|L)g(sS(p)|L)uL − p (A.36)


















Note that g(sS|L)/g(sS|H) is decreasing is sS. Let sS and s′S > sS be two possible
signal realizations of S. From the sorting condition the price announced by s′S must
exceed that announced by sS. Hence, there are two effects of a price increase on the
threshold: 1) the direct effect ([p − uL]/[uH − p] increases), 2) the signaling effect
(g(sS|L)/g(sS|H) decreases). For a separating equilibrium to be viable, the direct
effect should always prevail. In other words, the threshold must be always increasing
in p (or increasing in sS). We show that this cannot happen. Consider the limit
for sS → sS. Since g(sS|H)/g(sS|L) is monotonically increasing and has full support
(0,∞), the inverse ratio g(sS|L)/g(sS|H) must diverge to infinity for sS → sS. On the
other hand, the direct effect is bounded away from zero by [vL−uL]/[uH − vL] since S
would never announce a price below vL. It follows that for low realizations of sS the
signaling effect always prevails and therefore no separation is possible.
Lemma 10. No pooling-hybrid equilibrium in which trade occurs survives NWBR.
Denote with Σ(pˆ) the set of realizations for which S announces price pˆ with positive
probability. In any pooling-hybrid equilibrium in which trade occurs there always
exists some pˆ < uH such that Σ(pˆ) is non-singleton. Let sS < s˜S ≡ supΣ(pˆ) be
a realization of S’s signal and consider a deviation p > pˆ. We first show that all
sS ∈ Σ(pˆ) can be eliminated according to NWBR except for s˜S. Then we show that
also sS < s˜S, sS /∈ Σ(pˆ) can be eliminated. Finally, we show that there always exist
p > pˆ such that the probability to sell at p is not smaller than the probability to sell
at pˆ given B’s refined beliefs (which implies that it is always optimal to deviate to p).
Consider first the case sS ∈ Σ(pˆ). As already shown, the expected payoff for S when
sS is realized is:
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (s∗B|H)](pˆ− vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (s∗B|L)](pˆ− vL) (A.39)
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Consider a deviation p > pˆ. Upon observing p, B uses threshold sDB . Type sS would
(weakly) benefit from the deviation if:
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (sDB |H)](p− vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (sDB |L)](p− vL) ≥
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (s∗B|H)](pˆ− vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (s∗B|L)](pˆ− vL) (A.40)
According to NWBR, type sS is eliminated if the set of all s
D
B that make him weakly
benefit from the deviation is strictly contained in the set of sDB that make some other
type s′S strictly benefit. We can thus eliminate sS if, for all s
D
B such that (A.40) holds,
a seller receiving signal s˜S strictly benefits from the deviation. This happens if
Pr(H|s˜S)[1− F (sDB |H)](p− vH) + Pr(L|s˜S)[1− F (sDB |L)](p− vL) >
Pr(H|s˜S)[1− F (s∗B|H)](pˆ− vH) + Pr(L|s˜S)[1− F (s∗B|L)](pˆ− vL) (A.41)
However, from lemma 8 the above inequality is always verified for p > pˆ and s˜S > sS.
Therefore, type sS can be eliminated.
We now show that all sS /∈ Σ(pˆ) such that sS < s˜S can also be eliminated. Consider
then sS /∈ Σ(pˆ), sS < s˜S. In equilibrium, sS announces some price p′ to which B replies
with a threshold s′B. From incentive compatibility of type sS it follows that:
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (s′B|H)](p′ − vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (s′B|L)](p′ − vL) ≥
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (s∗B|H)](pˆ− vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (s∗B|L)](pˆ− vL) (A.42)
type sS weakly benefits from a deviation to p when:
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (sDB |H)](p− vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (sDB |L)](p− vL) ≥
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (s′B|H)](p′ − vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (s′B|L)](p′ − vL) (A.43)
Hence, in order to eliminate sS, it is sufficient to show that s˜S strictly benefits for any
sDB such that:
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (sDB |H)](p− vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (sDB |L)](p− vL) ≥
Pr(H|sS)[1− F (s∗B|H)](pˆ− vH) + Pr(L|sS)[1− F (s∗B|L)](pˆ− vL) (A.44)
but this, again, is implied by lemma 8.
In summary, all realizations sS < s˜S can be eliminated. It follows that B, upon
observing p, should believe that the deviation comes from seller of type s˜S or above.
This also holds when p > pˆ is not a deviation, i.e. when there are types (realizations
of sS) which announce p with positive probability in equilibrium. In this case the
sorting condition ensures that p is never announced by types sS < s˜S. We now show
that, given B’s refined beliefs, s˜S would strictly benefit from announcing some p > pˆ.
22
Assume p = pˆ +  with  > 0. For  small enough, the ex-ante probability (before
observing sB) with which B buys at p is greater than or equal to the probability with
which B buys at pˆ. To show this, it is sufficient to show that, for all realizations sB,
the ex-post probability with which B buys is larger when S announces p. Given sB,
denote with M(pˆ, sB) and with M(p, sB) B’s (refined) posterior belief that the good
is H upon observing pˆ and p respectively. Since all sS < s˜S can be eliminated from
p, it follows that M(p, sB) > M(pˆ, sB). It is then easy to show that there is always
 > 0 such that:
M(pˆ+ , sB)(uH − pˆ− ) + (1−M(pˆ+ , sB))(uL − pˆ− ) >
M(pˆ, sB)(uH − pˆ) + (1−M(pˆ, sB))(uL − pˆ) (A.45)
Hence, for  small enough B’s payoff is higher when buying at pˆ+  rather than at pˆ.
But then, the probability to buy cannot be lower at pˆ+  than at pˆ. Hence, S would
always benefit from increasing his price.
Lemma 11. There is always a NWBR-refined equilibrium in which trade does not
occur.
Consider a situation in which S always announces p = uH and B never buys (i.e.
s∗B = sB). This is clearly an equilibrium. It is also robust to NWBR since, for any
deviation p ≥ vL, the set of threshold values that make type sS willing to deviate
does not contain the set of best responses that make type s′S < sS willing to deviate.
Therefore, no signal realization can be eliminated.
A.3 Proof of proposition 3
In the game in which S sets the price, payoffs were given by:
q Price Taker (B) Price Setter (S)
H uH − p p− vH
L uL − p p− vL
(A.46)
with uH > uL, vH > vL, uH > vH , and vL > uL. Consider now the game in which
B announces a price p and gains from trade are reversed: vH > uH and uL > vL. In
words, quality H generates negative gains from trade while quality L yields positive
gains. We want to show that the two games are the same. Let A ∈ R be a number
greater than vH . Redefine B’s action as p˜ = A−p and qualities as H˜ = L, and L˜ = H.
Redefine also the evaluations as follows: v˜H = A − uL, v˜L = A − uH , u˜H = A − vL,
u˜L = A− vH . Clearly, the conditions u˜H > u˜L, v˜H > v˜L, u˜H > v˜H , and v˜L > u˜L hold.
Also, it is easy to check that net payoffs are unaffected by these transformations. The
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net payoffs for the game in which B sets the price can thus be expressed as:
q Price Taker (S) Price Setter (B)
H˜ u˜H − p˜ p˜− v˜H
L˜ u˜L − p˜ p˜− v˜L
(A.47)
Hence, this is the same game as that in which S sets the price.
A.4 Proof of proposition 4
We start by showing that the amount of trade and S’s profits are bounded away from
zero. Assume that D announces a price pD. B, who receives a signal sB, chooses to
buy at pD if:
λf(sB|H)
λf(sB|H) + (1− λ)f(sB|L)uH +
(1− λ)f(sB|L)
λf(sB|H) + (1− λ)f(sB|L)uL − p
D ≥ 0 (A.48)
solving for f(sB|H) yields:
f(sB|H) ≥ 1− λ
λ
pD − uL
uH − pD f(sB|L) (A.49)
Given monotonicity, B uses a threshold strategy on his own signal: he chooses to buy











uH − pD (A.50)
Profits for S are:
λ[pD − vH ][1− F (s∗B|H)] + (1− λ)[pD − vL][1− F (s∗B|L)] (A.51)
For pD > v(h), profits are positive unless the amount of trade is zero, i.e. F (s∗B|L) =
F (s∗B|H) = 1. However, this occurs only if s∗B = sB. From (A.50), this cannot happen
for any pD < uH . Hence, for p
D ∈ (vH , uH) both expected profits and expected amount
of trade are bounded away from zero. We now show that expected total surplus is also
bounded away from zero. Total surplus under delegation is:
λ[uH − vH ][1− F (s∗B|H)] + (1− λ)[uL − vL][1− F (s∗B|L)] (A.52)
where the second term is negative. Total surplus is positive when:
[1− F (s∗B|H)] >
(1− λ)[uL − vL]




Since inequality (A.49) must hold for every sB > s
∗
B, one can integrate both sides of
the inequality between s∗B and infinity:




uH − pD [1− F (s
∗
B|L)] (A.54)
Given (A.54), condition (A.53) always holds for pD ∈ (vH , uH). Since total surplus
is positive, welfare under delegation is higher than welfare in the absence of delegation.
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